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EU Citizenship Rights 
 
Richard Bellamy∗ 
Abstract: This article disputes the recent argument of Dimitry Kochenov 
advocating an ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’. His thesis rests on an 
untenable form of philosophical anarchism that overlooks the role played 
by our political obligations to state structures in securing rights. At best, 
his argument suggests a ‘thin’ form of EU citizenship that allows 
European citizens to choose which of the Member States they wish to 
become morally obliged to. A ‘thicker’ form of EU level citizenship 
could only arise by creating civic obligations at the EU level, the position 
he rejects. To the extent certain Court of Justice judgments in this area 
reflect parallel reasoning to Kochenov’s, they too suffer from a similar 
failure to appreciate the role of civic duties to particular Member States 
(or eventually the EU) in creating and securing the status of citizens as 
equal rights bearers. 
 
I Introduction and Structure: Kochenov’s Provocation 
Many commentators have seen the absence of civic duties relating to the 
rights of EU citizenship as a central flaw.1 In a recent article,2 Dimitry 
Kochenov disputes this view and defends ‘an EU citizenship without 
duties’. He begins by questioning whether citizenship rights necessarily 
entail correlative civic duties directly related to those rights on the part of 
the rights-bearer. Section II of his article claims that entailment has 
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1 E.g. J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Europa: “Nous coalisons des Etats, nous n’unissons pas des 
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increasingly become the exception rather than the rule within most 
democratic states.3  For example, he maintains that only a few countries 
regard the right to vote as entailing a duty to vote, or the right to security 
as involving a duty of national service, not just in time of war but also in 
peacetime.4 In this respect, he contends EU citizenship merely follows a 
more general trend. However, he extends this empirical observation to 
make a much broader argument of a normative nature. He adopts a 
philosophical anarchist position that denies any non-voluntary political 
obligation to obey the law, either in general or with regard to a particular 
state.5 He suggests that rights are best conceived as moral claims that 
every individual may make against all other individuals and that we ought 
to respect only to the extent justice requires us to do so. 6 The 
compatibility of existing laws or states with such moral rights justify any 
legitimate duties we may have to them, regardless of whether we are 
citizens or not.7 Indeed, he implies in Section III that the mutual 
recognition of these rights by all individuals alone suffices to coordinate 
human behaviour, taking us beyond the need for any political 
organisation that might have the coercive characteristics associated with 
states.8 In Section IV he applies the argument to EU citizenship and 
                                         
3 Kochenov (2014), 485-91 
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fill out gaps in Kochenov’s argument, is that of A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and 
Political Obligations (Princeton University Press, 1981), cited by Kochenov (2014), 
p. 484 n. 12 
6 The philosophical basis of Kochenov’s account of rights is not always clear. He 
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Rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175, cited at Kochenov (2014), 484 n. 14, 
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7 Kochenov (2014), 487 
8 Kochenov (2014), 491-95 
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argues that its implicit normative and functional logic not only reflects 
and helps promote what he calls the ‘de-dutification’ of citizenship but 
also points to the end of the very status of citizenship as membership of a 
particular political community and its replacement by responsible 
membership of the moral community of human beings. Consequently, 
those advocating that EU citizenship should become associated with a set 
of particular political duties fail to appreciate its transformative and 
radical nature. 
 While written in part as a provocation, Kochenov highlights and 
defends a key, yet often unarticulated or even recognised, implication of 
the cosmopolitan teleology that,9 in common with many others,10 he seeks 
to associate with European Citizenship: namely, its potential undermining 
of the political obligations of citizens not just to the Member States but 
also to the EU, where he believes such duties should remain absent. 
Given such a cosmopolitan teleology has figured in many of the most 
prominent accounts of EU Citizenship offered by both jurists and social 
and political theorists – not least Kochenov’s own prolific writing on this 
topic - and arguably forms a strong current in certain of the Court of 
Justice’s more controversial judgments, indicating some of its problems 
seems worthwhile.  
What follows centres on his normative argument and does not 
engage with his empirical survey of the ‘de-dutification’ process in 
Section II of his article.11 I start by disputing that rights can be 
                                         
9 Kochenov (2014), 488-89. 
10 E.g. in the writings of D. Kostakopoulou, to which Kochenov (2014) frequently 
approvingly refers (e.g. to D. Kostakopoulou, The Future Governance of Citizenship 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), 12–44 at 488 n. 43). 
11 Due to space constraints, I shall simply signal that his two related empirical claims, 
that 1) historically the link of citizenship rights to duties invariably had an 
exclusionary purpose and 2) that this linkage has steadily declined as citizenship has 
become more inclusive, can both be questioned. For example, compulsory voting was 
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disassociated from any obligation towards a given political community, 
as Kochenov proposes. I contend that some such duty is a condition of 
having rights. I then turn to the justifications for our having specific civic 
duties to a given state and their implications for his view of EU 
citizenship. I distinguish a ‘choice’ from a ‘civic’ account. While he 
favours the former, even on this account EU citizenship only proves 
compatible with a lack of civic duties at the EU level to the extent they 
remain strong at the Member State level. As a result, those seeking a 
thicker kind of EU citizenship are correct to believe it would entail a 
development of civic duties towards the EU. 
 
II Rights and Political Obligations towards the State 
The problems with Kochenov’s account emerge most clearly when one 
works backwards from his concluding assertion of ‘the inherent 
immorality of the state’.12 This thesis prompts the question of whether 
any moral grounds might exist for creating and having an obligation not 
just to states in general but to a particular state. In posing the issue in this 
way, I accept that we have no obligation to obey the laws of any state just 
because they are the laws – there must be some external moral reason that 
renders it justified to do so. I wish to suggest that one such external moral 
reason may be to secure the very status of individuals as free and equal 
rights bearers that Kochenov claims dissolves any such obligations. The 
                                                                                                                     
frequently introduced as an instrument of inclusion rather than exclusion, to promote 
participation by otherwise marginalized citizens within the democratic process (see A. 
Malkopoulou, The History of Compulsory Voting in Europe: Democracy's Duty? 
(Routledge, 2015)) Moreover, voting remains a legal obligation in a quarter of all 
democracies, with many mature democracies, such as the UK, seriously considering 
its introduction (See S. Birch, Full Participation: A Comparative Study of 
Compulsory Voting (Manchester University Press, 2009)). 
 
12 Kochenov (2014), 494. 
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reason is as follows: Kochenov’s argument requires for its coherence both 
that all activities requiring coordination and cooperation can be based on 
uncoerced choice, and that no major conflicts or disagreements exist 
between rival rights claims. Yet, the need for authoritative coordination 
and cooperation can be regarded as arising from the ‘circumstances of 
justice’ that lead to the need for rights in the first place, while the 
presence of conflicts and disagreements about these rights form the 
‘circumstances of politics’ within which rival claims need to be 
reconciled. Taken together, I shall contend that these two circumstances 
generate a rights-based reason to respect the need for political obligations 
in general and to obey and participate within a given state in particular. 
The rest of this section addresses the general argument, the next section 
the particular argument and its relationship to the ‘circumstances of 
citizenship’ – including EU Citizenship. 
 Consider first the ‘circumstances of justice’. Following Hume and 
Rawls,13 these circumstances can be attributed to scarcity, limited 
altruism and limited knowledge and power. If a superabundance of goods 
existed, all persons possessed an angelic disposition and, the road to hell 
being paved with good intentions, everyone could always second-guess 
each other’s actions and had the ability to achieve whatever they wished, 
then there would be no need for rights.14 In this idyllic Land of 
Cockaigne, rights would be superfluous. Its well provided for, pure and 
altruistic, omniscient and omnipotent inhabitants would have no need to 
make claims against each other. All could freely choose to act in 
whatever way they desired and, where necessary, would be able to 
spontaneously coordinate and cooperate with each other in ways that 
would always be mutually fulfilling and virtuous. In the absence of these 
                                         
13 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 1971) 126-30 
14 R. Bellamy, Rethinking Liberalism, (Pinter, 2000) 152-55. 
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conditions, there will always be competing and disputed claims on scarce 
goods and a need to settle them justly by deciding who is entitled to what. 
To secure certain freedoms – even something as mundane as driving 
through a busy town - will often require coordinating and cooperating 
with others, given that a complex road system and an urban environment 
will not appear without a degree of conscious planning. As in Feinberg’s 
imagined world of ‘Nowheresville’,15 much might be achieved by people 
being sensitive to others and dutifully acting on the obligations of some 
agreed moral code, although the limits of human practical reasoning 
would almost certainly still lead to some conflicts. However, in this 
situation individuals would be unable to claim as a right that they could 
drive at a given moment, such as when there was a green light, or build a 
house on the land they had bought for the purpose, have privacy or 
exercise free speech and so forth. They would always be dependent on 
others possessing sufficient good will and sensitivity to their needs to 
allow them to do so. 
To be able to claim a right without relying on the forbearance or 
virtue of others requires that it can be enforced even when these others 
oppose or simply neglect to uphold it. In other words, it requires that 
others can be obliged to recognise that right. The ‘circumstances of 
politics’ enter at this point.16 These circumstances derive from the need 
for a political authority to regulate people’s behaviour in ways that 
protect their rights, if need be through coercion, and that can do so 
legitimately, despite these same people often disagreeing about the nature 
and basis of their rights and the most appropriate and justified forms of 
regulation and coercion. As a result, rights emerge as dependent on 
                                         
15 Feinberg (1966), cited by Kochenov (2014) 484 n. 14 and 492. 
16 I take this term from J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999, pp. 107-18 and A. Weale, Democracy, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999, pp. 8-13. 
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politics and a political obligation to a given political community in two 
related senses. 
First, the very existence of rights depends upon individuals being 
equally subordinate to the laws of a common political authority capable 
of defining and upholding their rights in a uniform way. Otherwise, 
which rights they have, when they apply and what they entail will be 
matters of the differing private judgements of others – we may claim 
rights but will remain dependent on the consideration and benevolence of 
others for their recognition and enforcement. In such a situation, 
individuals will always be prone to injustice and domination by those 
more powerful than them and to committing, either intentionally or 
inadvertently, injustice and dominating others in their turn. Some neo 
liberals of an anarchist persuasion have denied such arguments and 
claimed that markets emerge through conventions and are capable of 
operating without any need for a state.17 Yet, as critics of this position – 
including many libertarians18 - note, the operation of markets requires the 
establishment of property rights and freedom of contract, which are only 
likely to be secured in an impartial and authoritative way by a state 
capable of enforcing duties. Not only would a pure free market, without 
any political assignment of rights and duties, be liable to being unjust, it 
would be largely unworkable as well. As a result, a duty to belong to and 
support some form of political community becomes an obligation of 
justice because such an arrangement is constitutive of the very possibility 
of a just scheme of rights.19 Without it, rights will not only not be upheld 
but also would not even exist, because there will be constant 
                                         
17 The classic text is D. Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, (Chu Hartley LLC, 3rd 
ed., 2014) 
18 Such as F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
19 This argument has Hobbesian and, in the version being employed here, Kantian 
roots – see A. Stiltz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation and the State, (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) 53-56. 
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disagreement as to which rights we have.20 Their assignment by courts 
will be entirely arbitrary – a form of what Natolino Irti has called 
juridical nihilism.21 
Of course, though a coercive political authority might be a 
condition of justice that does not mean that any given political authority 
is just. The second political aspect of rights emerges here. If justice is 
itself controversial we cannot appeal to it as an independent standard for 
adjudicating on the legitimacy of the various political arrangements that 
serve to instantiate it. Rather, we will need some form of political 
mechanism for claiming and defining our rights in a free and equal way  
against and with others. What might be called the ‘circumstances of 
citizenship’ arise at this point.22 
 
III The Circumstances of Citizenship and EU Citizenship 
The ‘circumstances of citizenship’ consist of the existing world of 
bounded polities within which issues of political membership arise. A 
wide variety of principles for deciding this issue exist both empirically 
and normatively. Here I focus on two accounts pertinent to the current 
discussion: what I shall call the ‘choice’ account and the ‘civic’ account. 
The choice account involves the importance of our being able to 
choose which political community we belong to. Though at times 
Kochenov appears to deny the need for any political authority at all,23 at 
others he seems to accept, as most philosophical anarchists do, 24 that 
some political authority might be needed. However, like them he argues 
                                         
20 See T. Honoré, ‘The Dependence of Morality on Law’, 13.1 (1993) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 1. 
21  N. Irti, Nichilismo giuridico, (Laterza, 2005). 
22 See R. Bauböck, ‘Morphing the Demos into the Right Shape. Normative Principles 
for Enfranchising Resident Aliens and Expatriate Citizens’, forthcoming p. 5, who 
talks of the ‘circumstance of democracy and citizenship’. 
23 E.g. Kochenov (2014), 494, 495. 
24 E.g. See A. J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy (CUP, 2001), chs 1 and 6. 
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its legitimacy depends on its being freely chosen by those subject to it.25 
Nevertheless, this position does not entirely fit with his denial of the need 
for any duties being associated with citizenship per se, as opposed to just 
with European Citizenship as a special sort of status. On this account, 
choosing a political community can be likened to an amateur singer 
choosing between choirs. Singing choral music is something that can only 
be achieved by being part of a collective organisation established for that 
purpose. If I am a big Bach fan, I will be inclined to choose the Bach 
rather than the Mozart choir, and if I have an above average voice I might 
prefer the choir I feel is strongest over the one nearest to where I live. 
Yet, having made these choices, I incur certain obligations – to attend 
practices, to follow the agreed tempo, not to sing fortissimo when my part 
is supposed to be piano, to stay the course and not to pull out before the 
final performance because I have got bored, and so forth. In other words, 
I acquire in this way a set of duties relating to membership of a particular 
choir.  
Likewise, though Kochenov follows Nozick in rejecting the ‘fair 
play’ argument for political obligation,26 as Simmons has noted this 
argument does apply in cases where we can choose whether or not to be 
members of a given community that produces certain collective goods – 
in this case the collective good of a certain pattern of rights relating to a 
given account of justice.27 If I have chosen to belong to a certain 
community then I acquire duties to cooperate in that community’s 
coercive maintenance of a unitary scheme of rights by obeying the law, 
paying taxes and so on. Moreover, when individuals can choose whether 
they belong to a libertarian or a communitarian polity, say, then that alone 
                                         
25 Kochenov (2014), 496-97. 
26 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basil Blackwell, 1974), at 95, cited in 
Kochenov (2014), 495. 
27 Simmons (2001) ch. 1. 
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provides the most effective (and necessary) incentive for all polities to 
enshrine a reasonable conception of justice.28  
This position would be perfectly compatible with a conception of 
European Citizenship as free from duties to any Member State in 
particular but allowing EU citizens free movement to choose between 
them. Pace Kochenov, though, it would not be free of all duties but 
involve something akin to what Rawls called ‘a natural duty to uphold 
just institutions’29: that is, a recognition that all the Member States reflect 
reasonable conceptions of justice that EU citizens should respect. 
Arguably, some such general duty lies behind those limits to EU 
citizenship rights that Kochenov and, in some cases and on some 
interpretations,30 the Court of Justice, 31 have challenged, such as an 
obligation not to undermine the fiscal capacity of each Member State to 
provide the public services democratically decided upon by citizens, 
including by limiting access to health and social security to those who 
have worked and contributed for a minimum period, to restrict voting in 
national elections to those willing to commit more permanently to 
membership by naturalising and so on. Indeed, the rationale for the EU 
not being a duty-free zone in the literal sense of EU citizens not being 
able to purchase goods free of duty when travelling between Member 
States, could be related to a general obligation to maintain the fiscal 
                                         
28 Kochenov (2014), 497 explicitly endorses this argument. 
29 Rawls (1971), 333-42. 
30 E.g. F. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity’, 1:2 (2009), 
European Political Science Review, 173. 
31 E.g. in Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v. Finanzamt Bergisch 
Gladbach [2007] ECR I-6849, Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1935, Case C-
157/99 Geraets - Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ [2001] ECR I-5473, Case C-
385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij O.Z, 
Zorgverzekeringen U.A [2003] ECR 1-4509, and Case C–372/04 Watts v. Bedford 
Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I–4325, where a judicially declared right of access to 
services seems to be disconnected from any duty to ensure they are funded and viable. 
Such reasoning corresponds to what Irti has called juridical nihilism (Irti, 2005). 
 11 
viability of States by preventing citizens simply shopping around at whim 
to the extent that no stable political communities would be possible. 32  
The philosophical anarchist account also suggests it would be inadvisable 
that the EU displaced the Member States to become itself a political 
community capable of exacting duties. For that would necessarily prevent 
citizens from choosing between the Member States.  
It is perhaps indicative of the ambivalences and ambiguities of 
Kochenov’s argument that it is unclear how far he would welcome this 
conclusion. The key problem confronting him, though, is that on this line 
of reasoning he can only avoid associating EU Citizenship with many 
duties because these remain largely linked to our membership of 
whichever Member State we choose. What EU Citizenship adds is a 
presumption that to the extent we can freely move between these States, 
then our obligations towards them are chosen and so legitimate. 
The most obvious difficulty with this account is that most 
individuals are sedentary and therefore exercise no choice. Only 2.75% of 
the EU population  - roughly 14 million people – currently reside on a 
stable basis in a Member State other than their own.33 Indeed, the choice 
account relies on this being the case. For the stable citizenship regimes of 
the Member States create the choices the free moving EU Citizens choose 
between. By contrast, the civic account for ensuring the legitimacy of the 
political authority applies even to those who have not moved or chosen 
their civic status but have rather acquired citizenship through birth. This 
account rests on the political authority being under the free and equal 
                                         
32  Arguably the Court of Justice has come to close to committing this error not only 
by not allowing the fiscal viability of public services such as health and education to 
be a consideration in restricting access to them, as in the Cases cited in n. 31, but also 
by treating national rules against tax avoidance as violations of free capital 
movement, on which see S. Ganghof, and P. Genschel  15(1): (2008a), ‘Taxation and 
Democracy in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, 58 
33 EC Press release 15 January 2014http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
9_en.htm 
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democratic control of those subject to it. The civic account is sometimes 
given a libertarian reading as suggesting that political authority is thereby 
subjected to the consent of citizens, and hence comes close to being 
something they have chosen. Yet, as the philosophical anarchist R. P. 
Wolff established some years ago, it is practically impossible for even the 
most direct form of democracy to provide a satisfactory method for 
citizens to consent.34 A more realistic view suggests that we have an 
obligation to participate with others in collectively determining on a free 
and equal basis the system of rights under which we happen to live.35  
Contra the philosophical anarchists, we can have rights-based 
obligations to participate in collective processes even when we have not 
chosen to do so. If I am wandering along a beach and come across a 
group of people who have formed a chain to pull in a fishing vessel that 
has got into trouble on the sea, then, assuming I am sufficiently fit to 
participate and those on the boat will plainly be in grave danger without 
this help, I am morally obliged to do my bit in this collective endeavour 
to save the lives of these fishermen. Analogously, it can be argued that 
given rights require a political authority through which they can be 
claimed and secured, I have an obligation to support and participate in 
those institutions that regulate the majority of my interactions with others 
to ensure that their rights are duly recognised and to do so in the way that 
most effectively leads to their being treated equitably. Individuals may 
not have chosen their political community, yet that does not mean they 
have no obligations towards it. Rather, they are like the beach stroller 
above who has a natural duty of justice to help save the fishermen or, in 
this case, to support a judicial authority necessary to uphold rights.  
                                         
34 R. P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Harper and Row, 1970). 
35 The argument that follows is indebted to Stilz (2009), ch. 7. 
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In this respect, being born into a given political community can be 
likened to finding oneself already a member of the local Bach choir, the 
members depending on you to do your bit in bringing about the collective 
performance that is a fair and equitable system of laws. That need not tie 
you forever to a given community anymore than one must remain a 
member of a given choir but, contra Kochenov, it constrains your 
freedom to flit from one to another at whim without any obligations 
whatsoever.36  It suggests that in moving to another state one either 
retains one’s civic membership of one’s original state, such as paying 
taxes, while still having the natural duty to uphold the just institutions of 
the state one visits, or one gives up one’s previous civic obligations and 
acquires another set to one’s new state. As I noted, the choice and civic 
accounts are not incompatible, rather the choice account is parasitic on 
the civic account. 
What are the implications of the civic account for EU Citizenship? 
Imagine the choirs of my original example operate democratically, 
choosing what to perform, who will conduct, and how often they practice 
by free and fair deliberation among their members followed by a majority 
vote. If some choirs form a union to perform certain large choral works, 
that may extend their civic choral obligations and engagements in a 
variety of ways. A series of democratic agreements between the original 
constituent choirs might allow singers to cooperate when necessary on 
joint larger projects that are mutually agreed and to freely move between 
these choirs, staying in the Bach choir but singing for extended or shorter 
periods in the Mozart choir, say, and possibly to switch allegiance 
permanently to the Mozart choir if they find they prefer it. It could even 
lead to the choirs amalgamating into a larger choir, of which the original 
smaller choirs become sub groups. By analogy, the prime rights based 
                                         
36 He appears to advocate this scenario Kochenov (2014) 497-98. 
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obligations of individuals within the EU will be to the system that 
regulates most of their interactions with others to preserve their rights. At 
present, that remains their Member States. Through democratic 
agreements between the Member States their citizens have acquired 
mutual rights of free movement but their civic duties remain principally 
to the Member State of their citizenship and, to a lesser degree, to any 
Member State they may have chosen to move to. Over time, those that do 
move may shift their civic obligations entirely to the chosen Member 
State by becoming citizens of it – indeed, arguably they have a duty to do 
so if their rights become increasingly dependent on that Member State.37 
To the extent the interconnections between individuals become more 
extensive, a rights based obligation may arise to establish more extensive 
political institutions of some kind that are likewise under the free and 
equal control of those subject to them. On the civic account, to the degree 
that the EU has become already and develops in the future as a juridical 
order distinct from the Member States, then so one can expect the duties 
of EU Citizens to support and control it to grow.38 
 
IV Conclusion 
I have argued that rights cannot be detached from either something like a 
state or obligations to it, as Kochenov suggests. A view of EU Citizenship 
                                         
37 On the obligation of immigrants to acquire citizenship, see Helder De Schutter and 
L. Ypi, ‘Mandatory Citizenship for Immigrants’, 45(2) (2015) British Journal of 
Political Science, 235. 
38 Some such reasoning seems to underlie Jurgen Habermas’s view of the EU 
undergoing a popular constitutional moment to establish an EU level democracy in 
The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity, 2012). Although I believe this 
result is better achieved by a ‘demoicratic’ Union of democratic states (R. Bellamy, 
''An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe': Republican 
Intergovernmentalism and Demoicratic Representation within the EU', Journal of 
European Integration 35(5) (2013): 499-516, this takes us beyond the immediate 
issue under debate here. 
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can be given that is light on duties and emphasises freedom of choice, but 
that choice account does not remove any obligations to particular 
Member States. If anything it makes those obligations all the more 
justified and necessary. The civic account could be read as weakening 
duties to the Member States but only in so far as it strengthens those that 
EU Citizens have to the EU. Either way, Kochonov’s picture of a duty-
free Europe seems open to rights-based objections. 
 
 
